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How Users Perceive and Respond to Security Messages:
A NeuroIS Research Agenda and Empirical Study
Anderson, B., Vance, A., Kirwan, B., Eargle, D., Jenkins, J. (2016), “How Users Perceive and
Respond to Security Messages: A NeuroIS Research Agenda and Empirical Study,” European
Journal of Information Systems, 25 (4), pp. 364-390.

ABSTRACT
Users are vital to the information security of organizations. In spite of technical
safeguards, users make many critical security decisions. An example is users’ responses to
security messages—discrete communication designed to persuade users to either impair or
improve their security status. Research shows that although users are highly susceptible to
malicious messages (e.g., phishing attacks), they are highly resistant to protective messages
such as security warnings. Research is therefore needed to better understand how users
perceive and respond to security messages.
In this article, we argue for the potential of NeuroIS—cognitive neuroscience applied to
information system (IS)—to shed new light on users’ reception of security messages in the
areas of (1) habituation, (2) stress, (3) fear, and (4) dual-task interference. We present an
illustrative study that shows the value of using NeuroIS to investigate one of our research
questions. This example uses eye tracking to gain unique insight into how habituation occurs
when people repeatedly view security messages, allowing us to design more effective security
messages. Our results indicate that the eye movement-based memory (EMM) effect is a cause
of habituation to security messages—a phenomenon in which people unconsciously scrutinize
stimuli that they have previously seen less than other stimuli. We show that after only a few
exposures to a warning, this neurological aspect of habituation sets in rapidly, and continues
with further repetitions.
We also created a polymorphic warning that continually updates its appearance and
found that it is effective in substantially reducing the rate of habituation as measured by the
EMM effect. Our research agenda and empirical example demonstrate the promise of using
NeuroIS to gain novel insight into users’ responses to security messages that will encourage
more secure user behaviors and facilitate more effective security message designs.
Keywords: Security messages, information security behavior, NeuroIS, habituation, dual-task
interference, eye tracking.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, information security has emerged as a top managerial concern, driving

the worldwide security technology and services market to a value of $67.2 billion in 2013, and it
is expected to increase to $86 billion by 2016 (Gartner, 2013). Despite the growing investment
in information security technology, users continue to represent the weakest link in security
(Furnell & Clarke, 2012). Accordingly, attackers increasingly target users to gain access to the
information resources of organizations (Mandiant, 2013).
A crucial aspect of security behavior is how users perceive and respond to security
messages—discrete communication designed to persuade users to either impair or improve
their information security posture. Research shows that users are susceptible to malicious
messages such as phishing attacks that prompt users to install malware or visit compromised
websites (Hong, 2012). A parallel stream of research shows that users routinely disregard
protective messages such as software security warnings (Bravo-Lillo et al, 2013). One reason
for the ineffectiveness of warnings is the mismatch between security concerns and security
behavior. For example, individuals’ stated security concerns have been found to be inconsistent
with their subsequent behavior in response to security warnings (Vance et al, 2014). These
empirical results confirm those of Crossler et al (2013), who called for research that explains the
discrepancy between security intentions and behaviors.
One promising means for exploring the security intention-behavior disparity in the
context of security messages is NeuroIS—cognitive neuroscience and its associated
neurophysiological measures applied to information systems (IS) (Dimoka et al, 2011). The
neural bases for cognitive processes can offer new insights into the complex interaction
between information processing and decision making (Dimoka et al, 2012), allowing researchers
to open the “black box” of cognition by directly observing the brain (Benbasat et al, 2010). The
potential of NeuroIS has been recognized by security researchers who have begun using
neurophysiological measures to investigate security behavior (e.g., Moody et al, 2011;
Warkentin et al, 2012; Hu et al, 2014; Vance et al, 2014). We term this approach neurosecurity
(Anderson et al, 2015a). Crossler et al. observed that “these studies, and others like them, will
offer new insights into individual behaviors and cognitions in the context of information security
threats” (2013, p. 96).
In this article, we argue for the potential of NeuroIS to shed new light on users’ reception
of security messages. We contribute to the nascent area of NeuroIS security research by
presenting a research agenda for examining cognitive and emotional responses to security
messages. To do so, we outline four key questions drawn from the security and cognitive
2

neuroscience literature that directly relate to how users receive and process security messages.
NeuroIS theories and methodologies can help advance pressing needs in each of these areas,
generating potentially fruitful streams of research. These are not the only important research
questions, but they represent the security issues that NeuroIS is ideally suited to address.
Therefore, our guiding questions for researching security messages via NeuroIS are:
1. How does habituation affect users’ responses to security messages?
2. What is the impact of stress on a users’ response to security messages?
3. How does fear influence users’ cognitive processing of security messages?
4. How does dual-task interference, e.g., multitasking, disrupt the cognitive processing
of security messages?
To illustrate how NeuroIS can be used to advance these research questions, we present
the results of an experiment that uses the NeuroIS method of eye tracking to begin exploring
our first research question on habituation. Habituation as a mental state is difficult to observe
using conventional methods. Therefore, security researchers have examined habituation
indirectly by observing its influence on security behavior rather than by measuring habituation
itself (e.g., Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007a; Bravo-Lillo et al, 2013). Although valuable
for highlighting the problem of habituation with regard to security warnings, these conventional
methods do not provide insight into the neurological process of habituation, which could lead to
more effective security message designs.
We illustrate the potential of NeuroIS to address this gap in two ways. First, using eye
tracking to measure the eye movement-based memory (EMM) effect—a neurological
phenomenon in which people unconsciously scrutinize images previously seen—we
demonstrate how habituation develops in the brain. We show that after only a few exposures to
a warning, habituation sets in rapidly and continues to decline with further repetitions. These
results (a) reveal how quickly habituation to warnings develops over time, and (b) provide a
neurobiological explanation for why it occurs—both contributions made possible through the
application of NeuroIS.
Second, we use eye tracking to evaluate the effectiveness of a security message
designed to reduce habituation, a polymorphic warning whose appearance changes with each
exposure. Previous studies of habituation were limited in their efforts to design warnings that
target habituation because they did not have the benefit of neurophysiological measures. Using
eye-tracking measures of the EMM effect, we were able to directly measure whether a
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polymorphic warning was effective in reducing habituation. We found that people were
substantially less habituated to polymorphic warnings compared to conventional warnings.
Our research agenda and illustrative experiment demonstrate the promise of using
NeuroIS to study users’ responses to security messages. We anticipate that the pursuit of this
research agenda will provide scholars with a more complete understanding of how users
neurologically process security messages, which will lead to the more accurate development
and application of theory (Dimoka et al, 2011). We also expect that the neurophysiological data
stemming from this research will guide the design and testing of more effective forms of security
messages to mitigate security threats to users (Dimoka et al, 2012). This article echoes Crossler
et al (2013) call to use NeuroIS methods to study information security behavior by identifying the
insights that can be gained through neurophysiological methods.
This article is organized as follows. First, we formally define security messages and give
a brief overview of NeuroIS methods. We then describe the literature review we performed to
identify our research questions. Next, for each research question, we highlight (a) existing gaps
in the security literature, and why these gaps are important to address, and (b) potential ways
NeuroIS can be used to address these gaps. We then show the value of applying NeuroIS to
investigate our research questions through an eye-tracking experiment. Finally, we describe the
implications of our research agenda for future research on security messages.
2
2.1

REVIEW OF SECURITY MESSAGES AND NEUROIS
Security Messages
We define a security message as discrete communication that is designed to persuade

users to either impair or improve their information security posture. Most security messages are
predominantly textual, such as software dialogs or email communication, but messages may be
aural, visual, or both, such as voicemail memos, signage, or online videos. See Appendix A for
a taxonomy of security messages. Our definition is broad in that it includes messages from both
attackers and defenders because both commonly use the same persuasive techniques and
cues (Dhamija et al, 2006; Abbasi et al, 2010; Bravo-Lillo et al, 2013), and engage many of the
same mental processes (Wright & Marett, 2010; Luo et al, 2013). Our definition is narrow,
though, because it includes only discrete messages, rather than the entirety of security-related
communication. The latter typically includes interaction with coworkers and peers; security,
education, training, and awareness (SETA); classroom instruction (Karjalainen & Siponen,
2011); and sustained social engineering attacks that might continue over hours, days, or longer
(Mitnick & Simon, 2001).
4

Table 1. Description and focus of measurement of commonly used neurophysiological tools
Neurophysiological tools

Focus of measurement

Strengths

Weaknesses

Psychophysiological tools

2.2

The Potential of NeuroIS to Explain Security Behavior
As the field of information security behavior matures, understanding why a particular

behavior happens becomes increasingly necessary. To this end, NeuroIS offers a promising
approach for investigating the effectiveness of security (Crossler et al, 2013). The neural bases
for human cognitive processes can offer new insights into the complex interactions among the
processing of security messages, decision making, and behavior (Dimoka et al, 2011).
Whereas IS researchers have historically relied on external measures of cognition, such
as survey responses or observed behavior, neuroscience methods allow researchers to open
the “black box” of cognition by directly observing brain processes (Benbasat et al, 2010).
NeuroIS holds the promise of “providing a richer account of user cognition than that obtained
from any other source, including the user himself” (Minnery & Fine, 2009, p. 73). The promise of
applying neuroscience to human-computer interaction (HCI) is to use insights from research on
neurological processes to design effective user interfaces that can help users make informed
decisions (Mach et al, 2010; Riedl et al, 2010).
Table 1 presents a sampling of the variety of tools and measures available in NeuroIS,
along with key citations for more information about each method. For further information, see
Dimoka et al (2012) and Riedl et al (2014), who offer a thorough discussion of the methods,
tools, and measurements associated with NeuroIS.
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Eye tracking
(e.g., Proctor & Vu, 2006;
Castellina et al, 2008)

Skin conductance response
(SCR) or electrodermal
activity (EDA)
(e.g., Dawson et al, 2011)

Eye pupil location (gaze)
and movement

Identify visual
activity;
clear visualization of
what was viewed at
any given moment

Doesn’t capture
peripheral vision;
can’t ensure gaze
equates with
thought or
attention; artificial
setting may bias
behavior

Sweat in eccrine glands of
the palms or feet

Low cost; easy to
use; minimal
intervention on
subjects

Lack of predictable
measurement;
habituation; still
some debate on
interpretation

Facial electromyography
(fEMG)
(e.g., Ekman et al, 1992;
Minas et al, 2014)

Electrical impulses on the
face caused by muscle
fibers

High degree of
precision, widely
accessible, minimally
invasive

Only a small
number of muscles
can be measured;
difficulty with
interpretation;
setting may bias
behavior

Electrocardiogram (ECG or
EKG)
(e.g., Ortiz de Guinea et al,
2013; Schellhammer et al,
2013)

Electrical activity on skin
caused by heart muscles

Minimally invasive;
low cost; widely
accessible

Heart rate may be
affected by a wide
variety of factors

Measurement of cortisol
levels
(e.g., Wastell & Newman,
1993; Riedl, 2012)

Level of cortisol (commonly
called the stress hormone)
in one’s bloodstream or
saliva.

Minimally invasive;
low cost

Cortisol levels peak
10–40 minutes after
stressor onset
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Psychophysiological tools (continued)

Mouse-cursor tracking
(e.g., Freeman & Ambady,
2010; Grimes et al, 2013)

The cursor location and
movement properties on
the screen

Inexpensive;
noninvasive; massdeployable; useful in
natural and nonlaboratory settings;
surrogate for
attention; changes in
movement precision
correlate with
emotional changes

Can’t capture
attention if the
mouse cursor is not
moving. Can’t
ensure movement
equates with
thought or
attention.

Brain imaging tools
Noninvasive;
standard data
analysis methods;
spatial resolution

Artificial setting;
temporal resolution
(few seconds’
delay); need to be
careful with
correlation vs.
causation

Metabolic changes in the
brain due to neural activity

Spatial resolution

Invasive (due to
injected tracer);
potentially harmful;
low temporal
resolution (2–3
minutes)

Electroencephalography
(EEG)
(e.g., Minas et al, 2014;
Vance et al, 2014)

Electrical potentials on the
scalp due to neural activity

Inexpensive; tolerant
of a little subject
motion; directly
measures electrical
activity; temporal
resolution in
milliseconds

Spatial resolution;
only sensitive to
outer layers of
cortex

Magnetoencephalography
(MEG)
(e.g., Pantev et al, 2004;
Moses et al, 2007)

Magnetic field changes due
to neural activity

Temporal resolution
in milliseconds;
deeper capability
than EEG

Spatial resolution

Functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI)
(e.g., Dimoka, 2010, 2012)

Positron emission
tomography (PET)
(e.g., Haier et al, 1988;
Bench et al, 1993)

Blood flow changes or
blood oxygenation level
dependent signal (BOLD
response) in the brain due
to neural activity
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Table 1. Description and focus of measurement of commonly used neurophysiological tools
Neurophysiological tools

Focus of measurement

Strengths

Weaknesses

Identify visual
activity;
clear visualization of
what was viewed at
Noninvasive;
less
any given moment
expensive than fMRI

Doesn’t capture
peripheral vision;
can’t ensure gaze
equates with
thought
Can onlyorstimulate
attention;
2 in deep;artificial
may
setting
bias
induce may
seizure
or
behavior
fainting

Low cost; easy to
use; minimal
Noninvasive; less
intervention on
expensive and more
subjects
portable than fMRI

Lack of predictable
measurement;
Can
only measure
habituation;
still
cortical
activityon4
some debate
cm
deep
interpretation

Psychophysiological tools

Brain imaging tools (continued)
Eye tracking
Eye
pupil
location
(gaze)
Weak
electrical
current
(e.g., Proctor & Vu, 2006;
and
movement
Transcranial
causes activity in specific
Castellina et magnetic
al, 2008)
stimulation (TMS)
parts of the brain—
(e.g., Hiraga et al, 2009;
measure activity and
Schutter & van Honk, 2009) function of specific
connections/pathways
Skin conductance response
Functional
near-infrared
(SCR) or electrodermal
Sweat in eccrine glands of
Blood flow changes (BOLD
spectroscopy
activity (EDA) (fNIR)
the palms or feet
response) in the brain due
(e.g., Dawson
Kemper et
et al,
al, 2007;
2011)
to neural activity
Gefen et al, 2014)
Facial electromyography
(fEMG)
(e.g., Ekman et al, 1992;
Minas et al, 2014)

Electrical impulses on the
face caused by muscle
fibers

High degree of
precision, widely
accessible, minimally
invasive

Only a small
number of muscles
can be measured;
difficulty with
interpretation;
setting may bias
behavior

Electrocardiogram (ECG or
EKG)
(e.g., Ortiz de Guinea et al,
2013; Schellhammer et al,
2013)

Electrical activity on skin
caused by heart muscles

Minimally invasive;
low cost; widely
accessible

Heart rate may be
affected by a wide
variety of factors

Measurement of cortisol
levels
(e.g., Wastell & Newman,
1993; Riedl, 2012)

Level of cortisol (commonly
called the stress hormone)
in one’s bloodstream or
saliva.

Minimally invasive;
low cost

Cortisol levels peak
10–40 minutes after
stressor onset
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Psychophysiological tools (continued)

Mouse-cursor tracking
(e.g., Freeman & Ambady,
2010; Grimes et al, 2013)

The cursor location and
movement properties on
the screen

Inexpensive;
noninvasive; massdeployable; useful in
natural and nonlaboratory settings;
surrogate for
attention; changes in
movement precision
correlate with
emotional changes

Can’t capture
attention if the
mouse cursor is not
moving. Can’t
ensure movement
equates with
thought or
attention.

Brain imaging tools
Noninvasive;
standard data
analysis methods;
spatial resolution

Artificial setting;
temporal resolution
(few seconds’
delay); need to be
careful with
correlation vs.
causation

Metabolic changes in the
brain due to neural activity

Spatial resolution

Invasive (due to
injected tracer);
potentially harmful;
low temporal
resolution (2–3
minutes)

Electroencephalography
(EEG)
(e.g., Minas et al, 2014;
Vance et al, 2014)

Electrical potentials on the
scalp due to neural activity

Inexpensive; tolerant
of a little subject
motion; directly
measures electrical
activity; temporal
resolution in
milliseconds

Spatial resolution;
only sensitive to
outer layers of
cortex

Magnetoencephalography
(MEG)
(e.g., Pantev et al, 2004;
Moses et al, 2007)

Magnetic field changes due
to neural activity

Temporal resolution
in milliseconds;
deeper capability
than EEG

Spatial resolution

Functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI)
(e.g., Dimoka, 2010, 2012)

Positron emission
tomography (PET)
(e.g., Haier et al, 1988;
Bench et al, 1993)

Blood flow changes or
blood oxygenation level
dependent signal (BOLD
response) in the brain due
to neural activity
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Table 1. Description and focus of measurement of commonly used neurophysiological tools
Neurophysiological tools

Focus of measurement

Strengths

Weaknesses

Identify visual
activity;
clear visualization of
what was viewed at
Noninvasive;
less
any
given moment
expensive than fMRI

Doesn’t capture
peripheral vision;
can’t ensure gaze
equates with
thought
Can onlyorstimulate
attention;
2 in deep;artificial
may
setting
bias
induce may
seizure
or
behavior
fainting

Low cost; easy to
use; minimal
Noninvasive; less
intervention on
expensive and more
subjects
portable than fMRI

Lack of predictable
measurement;
Can only measure
habituation;
still
corticaldebate
activityon4
some
cm deep
interpretation

Psychophysiological tools

Brain imaging tools (continued)
Eye tracking
Eye
pupil
location
(gaze)
Weak
electrical
current
(e.g., Proctor & Vu, 2006;
and
movement
Transcranial
causes activity in specific
Castellina et magnetic
al, 2008)
stimulation (TMS)
parts of the brain—
(e.g., Hiraga et al, 2009;
measure activity and
Schutter & van Honk, 2009) function of specific
connections/pathways
Skin conductance response
Functional
near-infrared
(SCR)
or electrodermal
Sweat in eccrine glands of
Blood flow changes (BOLD
spectroscopy
activity
(EDA) (fNIR)
the palms or feet
response) in the brain due
(e.g., Dawson
Kemper et
et al,
al, 2007;
2011)
to neural activity
Gefen et al, 2014)
Facial electromyography
(fEMG)
(e.g., Ekman et al, 1992;
Minas et al, 2014)

Electrical impulses on the
face caused by muscle
fibers

High degree of
precision, widely
accessible, minimally
invasive

Only a small
number of muscles
can be measured;
difficulty with
interpretation;
setting may bias
behavior

Electrocardiogram (ECG or
EKG)
(e.g., Ortiz de Guinea et al,
2013; Schellhammer et al,
2013)

Electrical activity on skin
caused by heart muscles

Minimally invasive;
low cost; widely
accessible

Heart rate may be
affected by a wide
variety of factors

Measurement of cortisol
levels
(e.g., Wastell & Newman,
1993; Riedl, 2012)

Level of cortisol (commonly
called the stress hormone)
in one’s bloodstream or
saliva.

Minimally invasive;
low cost

Cortisol levels peak
10–40 minutes after
stressor onset
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Psychophysiological tools (continued)

Mouse-cursor tracking
(e.g., Freeman & Ambady,
2010; Grimes et al, 2013)

The cursor location and
movement properties on
the screen

Inexpensive;
noninvasive; massdeployable; useful in
natural and nonlaboratory settings;
surrogate for
attention; changes in
movement precision
correlate with
emotional changes

Can’t capture
attention if the
mouse cursor is not
moving. Can’t
ensure movement
equates with
thought or
attention.

Brain imaging tools
Noninvasive;
standard data
analysis methods;
spatial resolution

Artificial setting;
temporal resolution
(few seconds’
delay); need to be
careful with
correlation vs.
causation

Metabolic changes in the
brain due to neural activity

Spatial resolution

Invasive (due to
injected tracer);
potentially harmful;
low temporal
resolution (2–3
minutes)

Electroencephalography
(EEG)
(e.g., Minas et al, 2014;
Vance et al, 2014)

Electrical potentials on the
scalp due to neural activity

Inexpensive; tolerant
of a little subject
motion; directly
measures electrical
activity; temporal
resolution in
milliseconds

Spatial resolution;
only sensitive to
outer layers of
cortex

Magnetoencephalography
(MEG)
(e.g., Pantev et al, 2004;
Moses et al, 2007)

Magnetic field changes due
to neural activity

Temporal resolution
in milliseconds;
deeper capability
than EEG

Spatial resolution

Functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI)
(e.g., Dimoka, 2010, 2012)

Positron emission
tomography (PET)
(e.g., Haier et al, 1988;
Bench et al, 1993)

Blood flow changes or
blood oxygenation level
dependent signal (BOLD
response) in the brain due
to neural activity
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Brain imaging tools (continued)
Transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS)
(e.g., Hiraga et al, 2009;
Schutter & van Honk, 2009)

Weak electrical current
causes activity in specific
parts of the brain—
measure activity and
function of specific
connections/pathways

Noninvasive; less
expensive than fMRI

Can only stimulate
2 in deep; may
induce seizure or
fainting

Functional near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIR)
(e.g., Kemper et al, 2007;
Gefen et al, 2014)

Blood flow changes (BOLD
response) in the brain due
to neural activity

Noninvasive; less
expensive and more
portable than fMRI

Can only measure
cortical activity 4
cm deep
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IDENTIFYING RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINING USERS’ RECEPTION OF
SECURITY MESSAGES THROUGH THE LENS OF NEUROIS
To select questions for our research agenda, we took a three-pronged approach by

analyzing (1) security message literature from premier IS and HCI-security publications; (2) ISsecurity research essays and calls for papers; and (3) NeuroIS literature. Approaches (1) and
(2) helped identify important and relevant research questions, while approach (3) ascertained
whether the research questions identified would be productively investigated using NeuroIS
methods. This approach follows the recommendation of vom Brocke and Liang (2014), who
emphasize the importance of selecting NeuroIS research questions that, first and foremost,
answer problems of importance to the IS community, and secondly, benefit from studies using
neurophysiological measures.
3.1

Survey of the IS and HCI-Security Literature
To identify articles describing security messages, we searched for articles in the AIS

Senior Scholars basket of six journals (AIS-6; Lowry et al, 2013), and in premier computer
science publications on human-computer interaction and security, including the Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS), and the USENIX Security Symposium. In each of these outlets, we searched for
articles with security in the title, abstract, or keywords that were published before July 2014. We
also filtered the articles based on whether they included terms derived from our taxonomy in
Appendix A. We narrowed the articles to include only those that were behaviorally oriented and
focused on security messages. Our review resulted in 29 articles, some of which addressed
multiple research questions. These articles, combined with the IS search results, are listed in
Table B1 of Appendix B.
Table 2 summarizes the overarching research questions extracted from the papers we
reviewed and the count of articles that supported each one. Table B2 of Appendix B presents a
12

detailed research question set showing each question identified and its frequency of
occurrence. Several studies examined participants’ attitudes, beliefs, and motivations related to
security messages, but there was no cohesion on that topic. Thus, this paper does not address
this research question.
Table 2. Reduced research questions sorted by
article count
Research Question
Count

3.2

Attention/habituation

22

Comprehension

18

Attitudes and beliefs, motivations

10

Fear

6

Dual-task interference

6

Stress

5

Gender differences

1

Social norms

1

Uncertainty

1

Survey of the IS Security Calls for Research
We next compared the research questions against (1) calls for papers (CFP) for special

issues of journals and for conferences, and (2) IS security issues and opinion pieces. We
performed this search by gathering papers from IS venues to determine whether any question
from our reduced set of research questions in Table 2 should be weighted more heavily. The
new set of papers consisted of 10 papers, listed in Table B3 of Appendix B.
In our analysis of these papers, Tarafdar et al (2013) strongly emphasized the need for
stress to be researched. Similarly, Crossler et al (2013) explicitly highlighted the importance of
fear in research. Many of the papers called for IS-security research on high-level topics such as
“behavioral security,” “explaining information security policy compliance,” and “volitional and
accidental security policy violations.” Over half of the papers explicitly or implicitly called for
research on the intention-behavior gap (discussed in Section 4). We found support for all of our
research questions except for gender differences; thus, we removed it from our set of questions.
3.3

Survey of the NeuroIS Literature
For the third step, we searched NeuroIS opinion publications and research agenda

articles to evaluate whether the research questions identified above could be examined using
neurophysiological measures. For this step, we collected all NeuroIS research agendas or
opinion pieces published through 2014. This set included six articles, listed in Table B4 of
Appendix B. Based on this review, all of the topics in Table 2 (omitting gender) could be
13

considered “antecedents of human behavior,” which several articles suggest exploring with
NeuroIS (e.g., Dimoka et al, 2011). Thus, we found support for studying each of the research
questions using neurophysiological measures. Table B5 summarizes our NeuroIS paper
findings.
Last, we evaluated whether conventional, non-NeuroIS methods would be better suited
for studying our research questions. This follows Dimoka et al.’s guidance of having “a good
rationale for using neurophysiological tools” (2012, p. 694). We determined that while
comprehension could be studied using NeuroIS methods, other methods such as talk-aloud
protocols (e.g., Egelman et al, 2008; Felt et al, 2012), are also useful for examining
comprehension. For this reason, we eliminated “comprehension” from our set of research
questions.
The above analysis led to the selection of four areas for our research agenda: (1)
habituation, (2) fear, (3) stress, and (4) dual-task interference. Table 3 summarizes our rationale
for the selection of these research questions. We excluded the remaining research questions for
various reasons. Neither attitudes and beliefs nor motivations coalesced around a single theme,
so we excluded those from consideration in this research agenda. Gender differences were not
supported by IS security research essays and CFPs. The occurrence of references to
uncertainty and norms in the information security literature was too low to be included in a
different topic for this research agenda. Finally, we determined that comprehension is
sufficiently examined using non-NeuroIS methods.

14

Table 3. Summary of rationale for selection of research questions
Occurrence
RQ
frequency
Selected
Rationale
(n)

4

Attention/habituation

22

✓

Strong support

Comprehension

18



NeuroIS not necessary

Attitudes and beliefs,
motivations

10



Items in this category too general, failed to
coalesce around a central theme

Fear

6

✓

Strong support

Dual-task interference

6

✓

Strong support

Stress

5

✓

Strong support

Gender differences

1



No strong support in IS or CS literature

Social Norms

1



Frequency of occurrence too low

Uncertainty

1



Frequency of occurrence too low

RESEARCH AGENDA
The four questions of this research agenda share the ability to explain the intention-

behavior gap—the discrepancy between stated intentions and realized behaviors—a major
problem of inquiry in the social sciences. In a meta-analysis examining the influence of
intentions on behavior (n = 82,107 total participants), intentions accounted for 28% of variance
in behavior, leaving 72% unexplained (Sheeran, 2002). This gap has special importance in the
behavioral security domain because in securing systems, “it is the behavior that matters and not
the intention to perform the behavior” (Crossler et al, 2013, p. 95).
NeuroIS methods have great potential to measure cognitive and emotional factors that
may strongly influence behavior and yet not rise to the level of awareness (Riedl et al, 2014).
For this reason, Crossler et al (2013) called for security scholars to employ NeuroIS methods to
better understand factors influencing the intention-behavior gap. This point was empirically
underscored by Vance et al (2014), who found that electroencephalography (EEG) predicted
security behaviors substantially better than self-reported measures did.
Factors such as habituation, stress, fear, and dual-task interference help to explain
behaviors that may appear to be careless, indifferent, or accidental security-related behavior
(Vance et al, 2014). With this perspective, Figure 1 presents a framework that illustrates how
each of the research questions, comprising cognitive and emotional factors, has the potential to
moderate the relationship between users’ intentions and behaviors in response to security
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messages. However, each of these factors may themselves exert direct effects on security
behavior.

Figure 1. Framework for research questions

4.1

Research Question 1: How does habituation affect users’ responses to security
messages?
A major contributor to security message failure is habituation—the diminishing of

attention because of frequent exposure to warnings (Kalsher & Williams, 2006). Some
laboratory experiments have pointed to the role of habituation in users’ failure to heed warnings
and security indicators (Good et al, 2005; Dhamija et al, 2006; Wu et al, 2006; Schechter et al,
2007; Sharek et al, 2008). Egelman et al (2008) found a significant correlation between
recognition and disregard of security warnings. Sunshine et al (2009) observed that participants
remembered their responses to previous security warnings and applied them to other websites
even if the level of risk had changed. Felt et al (2012) found that 42% of participants were not
aware of having interacted with security permission dialogs before installing an Android app on
their devices. Similarly, some participants in Sotirakopoulos et al (2011) study clicked through
security warnings during a task, and later reported that they had not seen any security warnings
(see also user account control prompts in Motiee et al, 2010).
These laboratory study results reflect those in the field. Akhawe and Felt (2013) found
that in approximately 50% of the most common type of secure sockets layer (SSL) web browser
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warnings in Google Chrome, users decided to click through in 1.7 seconds or less, a finding that
“is consistent with the theory of warning fatigue” (Akhawe & Felt, 2013, p. 14). Felt et al (2014)
found that warning design explained between one-third and one-half of the difference between
Chrome and Firefox SSL warnings. Bravo-Lillo et al (2013) conducted a large field experiment
using Amazon Mechanical Turk in which users were rapidly exposed to a confirmation dialog
message. After a period of 2.5 minutes and a median of 54 exposures to the dialog message,
only 14% of the participants recognized a change in the content of the confirmation dialog in
their control (status quo) condition.
4.1.1

Habituation: Important Gaps in the Literature
The literature reviewed above examined habituation indirectly by observing the influence

of habituation on security behavior (Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007b; Bravo-Lillo et al,
2013). For example, behavioral laboratory experiments, think-aloud protocols, interviews, selfreport measures, and time-based measures have been used to identify whether stimuli capture
attention or invoke mental processes related to habituation (e.g., Good et al, 2005; Egelman et
al, 2008; Felt et al, 2012; Akhawe & Felt, 2013). While this research is valuable for
demonstrating the existence of habituation, it does not directly measure the mental process of
habituation, and therefore is unable to provide insight into (1) how habituation develops in the
brain in response to security messages, and (2) how the neurological manifestation of
habituation affects security behaviors. The lack of a means to directly measure these mental
processes of habituation limits the ability to design security messages and interventions that
directly address the phenomenon.
A fundamental gap in the above studies is that they examine habituation as a behavior,
when in fact the phenomenon is neurobiological. Habituation, or repetition suppression as it is
referred to in neuroscience, is one of the most pervasive and robust phenomena in neurobiology
(Rankin et al, 2009). For example, Kandel and colleagues demonstrated in a series of nowclassic studies using sea slugs that neural responses to a given stimulus decreased with
repeated exposures to that stimulus (Kandel, 2001). This kind of repetition suppression to
repeated stimuli has also been widely observed in humans (for review, see Grill-Spector et al,
2006). For example, using fMRI, researchers have observed involuntary decreases in mental
activity (as measured via blood flow) for repeated stimuli at delays ranging from seconds to
days (van Turennout et al, 2000). Studies that examine habituation without considering these
neurological underpinnings provide only a partial view of the problem. Because habituation
occurs unconsciously at the neurobiological level, interventions designed to encourage greater
vigilance on the part of users—such as SETA programs—will have limited efficacy.
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It should be noted that despite sharing the same Latin root, the construct of habituation
is very different from the construct of habit. Habit is defined as “learned sequences of acts that
have become automatic responses to specific cues, and are functional in obtaining certain goals
or end-states” (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999, p. 104). Thus, habit occurs at the behavioral level,
and involves learned behaviors that are associated with specific outcomes. In contrast,
habituation occurs at the neurobiological level (Ramaswami, 2014), and does not require
subsequent behavior, but occurs involuntarily without conscious awareness (Grill-Spector et al,
2006).
Another important gap in the habituation literature is that current approaches do not
reveal how perception changes over time. The EMM effect explains that people begin “seeing” a
familiar stimulus less via visual scrutiny and more from memory of their first view of the stimulus
(Smith et al, 2006). This phenomenon is manifested systematically in fewer eye-gaze fixations
and less visual sampling of regions of the image after repeated viewings (Hannula et al, 2010).
In this way, eye movement is an index of a person’s attention to and memory of an image over
time (Beck et al, 2007; Hannula & Ranganath, 2009). This is an important aspect of habituation
that traditional measures do not capture, and has important implications for the display of
security messages. It suggests that security messages should highlight differences in warnings
or their appearance should change, rather than relying on users to visually scrutinize the
warnings.
4.1.2

Habituation: How NeuroIS Can Be Used to Address these Gaps
NeuroIS can help address the above gaps by directly measuring the mental process of

habituation to determine (1) how quickly habituation develops in response to security messages,
(2) how the neurological manifestation of habituation affects security behaviors, and (3) how
long the effects of habituation on security messages persist. NeuroIS measures of habituation
could potentially enable the testing of security messages and interventions that are resistant to
habituation, minimize its effects, and speed recovery from habituation to security messages.
Of the various NeuroIS methods, fMRI and eye tracking are especially relevant when
studying habituation. fMRI can track neural activation through changes in blood oxygenation,
known as the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response. fMRI can determine
whether there is a decrease in activation (the repetition suppression effect) in brain regions
associated with visual processing when security warnings are viewed repeatedly. The repetition
suppression effect has been established in the context of images (e.g., Bakker et al, 2008), but
it is not yet clear how this effect applies to security messages that have both visual and textual
elements.
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Eye tracking is an appropriate tool to measure habituation. Eye-tracking tools can
precisely measure eye position and movement (Shimojo et al, 2003), including eye fixation,
pupil dilation, and gaze duration on areas of interest (Rayner, 1998). Distinct from other NeuroIS
tools, eye tracking’s most notable advantage is its ability to measure human visual activities with
a high level of accuracy and temporal precision. This information is not possible through selfreporting because people are unable to perfectly recall or not fully conscious of what they saw,
where they looked, and in what order they looked (e.g., Schechter et al, 2007; Egelman et al,
2008; Sunshine et al, 2009). Eye tracking allows researchers to understand what participants
attend to, and therefore what can be perceived (Smith et al, 2006; Benbasat et al, 2010). Eyetracking tools provide data such as heat maps to indicate the percentage of time spent gazing at
any particular area (see Figure 2). Therefore, capturing the EMM effect through an eye tracker
is a robust means of evaluating habituation.

Figure 2. Eye tracker heat maps for two security messages.

A possible experimental design for using either fMRI or eye tracking to study habituation
is a within-subject, repeated measures laboratory experiment. Images for a variety of security
messages could be repeatedly displayed to participants. To measure habituation’s onset, the
BOLD response level for fMRI, the number of eye-gaze fixations, or length of gaze duration
could be compared across the first, second, and subsequent exposures for each image of a
security message. Because time is inherent to the process of habituation, the above approach
could be extended to a longitudinal design to gauge how habituation to security messages
changes over days (with experimental sessions at the same time every day) or over weeks (with
experimental sessions once a week for several weeks).
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4.2

Research Question 2: What is the impact of stress on a user’s response to security
messages?
Recent research has highlighted the importance of examining “technostress” (e.g.,

Tarafdar et al, 2013), which is stress caused by interactions with information communication
technologies (Brod, 1984). Stress can have profound detrimental effects on individuals'
productivity and well-being (Riedl, 2012). One perspective of stress is as an evaluative
transaction between an individual and a required task when the individual perceives that he or
she lacks the resources or skills necessary to complete a required task (Cooper et al, 2001;
Ayyagari et al, 2011).
Being under stress affects an individual’s physiology, affect, and behavior (Sonnentag &
Frese, 2003). An individual under chronic stress is more likely to have narrowed attention and
poorer working memory capacity (Searle et al, 1999). These outcomes of stress on behavior
have been associated with individuals making poor decisions; for example, Wall Street traders
under stress made worse risk evaluations than traders did under less stress (Riedl, 2012).
Intrusive technology characteristics are a strong predictor of stressors for users, and work
overload is one of the most prevalent stressors (Ayyagari et al, 2011). Perceiving system
annoyances often results in heightened stress states (Riedl, 2012).
D'Arcy et al (2014) showed that technostress has important implications for end-user
security. They conceptualize “security-related stress” (SRS) as comprising the subdimensions of
work overload, complexity, and uncertainty of security requirements. In a field survey, they
found that SRS significantly influenced moral disengagement, and indirectly, intention to violate
information security policy. Several studies have sought to avoid or diminish technostressrelated problems in connection with users experiencing security messages. Felt et al (2012)
recommended a more parsimonious set of Android permission prompts to avoid overwhelming
users with too much information. Dhamija and Tygar emphasized that their security tool
“[placed] a very low burden on the user in terms of effort, memory and time” (2005, p. 4).
Akhawe and Felt (2013) reasoned that a high level of browser SSL warning click-through rates
might be the users’ annoyance with too many warnings. Security in general can be stressful for
users—in a study of password meters, participants reported annoyance with meters that had
stringent security demands (Ur et al, 2012). Given these pernicious outcomes of stress on
security message interactions, it is important to better understand the role of stress in users’
security decisions.
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4.2.1

Stress: Important Gaps in the Literature

The work of D'Arcy et al (2014) illustrates an important gap in the stress-related security
literature: self-report measures capture only one aspect of the technostress—the perceptual
measure of stress-inducing conditions. D’Arcy et al. consider this as a limitation of their and
“most psychological stress research” and call for future research to “build on our initial work and
utilize objective measures (e.g., physiological techniques) to gauge SRS” (2014, p. 308). This
gap is highlighted by Tams et al (2014) who conducted a study to compare the ability of selfreport and physiological measures to capture the construct of technostress. They found that
salivary alpha-amylase explained variance in performance of a computer-based task beyond
that predicted by self-report stress measures. They explained that:
Physiological measures are complements to psychological ones rather than alternatives;
the triangulation of physiological measures with psychological ones can result in a more
holistic representation of IS constructs. This finding suggests that physiological
measures are a vital complement to existing methods since they can improve the
prediction of outcomes related to such IS phenomena as technostress above and
beyond that afforded by psychological measures. (p. 737)
Tams et al. found that the physiological and self-report measures of technostress did not
correlate. They therefore concluded, consistent with the technostress and neurobiological
literature, that their self-report and physiological measures of technostress corresponded to the
conscious and unconscious aspects of technostress, respectively (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: How psychological and physiological measures capture different aspects of the
technostress construct.

These findings have important implications in the context of security messages, in which
users are not always aware of their emotions (Dimoka et al, 2011; Lopatovska & Arapakis,
2011). Because security messages often appear for only a short duration and frequently lack
users’ full attention, users may have difficulty accurately recalling and reporting their level of
stress while viewing the message. Hence, users’ self-reported emotions are often inconsistent
with their actual emotions (Tams et al, 2014), and measures of stress alone are likely to be
insufficient (Riedl, 2012), leading to an incomplete understanding of how technostress affects
the processing of security messages and partial solutions for security practice. Tams et al
(2014) suggest a combination of psychological and physiological measures to fully capture the
construct of technostress.
NeuroIS methods can provide several insights into the relationship between the
processing of security messages and stress that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. For
example, NeuroIS can explore how actual physiological stress (rather than self-reported stress)
influences the reception of security messages (Tams et al, 2014). NeuroIS tools can be used to
measure the magnitude and duration of stress and its influence on security message disregard
and performance, which may be subject to biases, recall error, and unawareness if measured
using self-reporting for discrete events such as interactions with security messages (Tams et al.
2014). NeuroIS tools can explore which neurological functions are inhibited by stress, and at
what levels they are inhibited (Riedl, 2012). Researchers can thereby design security messages
that are less reliant on these neurological functions, and can be processed more effectively
under stressful conditions. In each of these scenarios, NeuroIS offers the potential to provide
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new insights into how technostress influences users’ reactions to security messages that would
be difficult to obtain otherwise.
4.2.2

Stress: How NeuroIS Can Be Used to Address these Gaps
Two neurophysiological methods for measuring stress are cortisol level measurement

and skin conductance response (SCR). Cortisol is commonly called the stress hormone.
Cortisol and other biological measurements are often favored because they can measure
unconscious stress responses (Riedl, 2012; Riedl et al, 2012). When an individual’s stress level
increases, so does the amount of cortisol in the body as psychological stressors stimulate its
release into the bloodstream. Cortisol mediates stress responses and returns the body to
homeostasis (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Cortisol levels peak 10–40 minutes after stressor
onset as measured using blood, spinal fluid, or saliva samples (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004).
Riedl et al (2012) demonstrated how technostress could be measured using cortisol samples.
Examining cortisol levels allows researchers to objectively measure stress associated with
security messages.
SCR is also known as galvanic skin response or electrodermal activity. The increase in
the activity of sweat glands when an individual is stressed creates a temporary condition in
which the skin becomes a better electricity conductor (Randolph et al, 2005). SCR has been
linked to measures of arousal, excitement, fear, emotion, and attention (Raskin, 1973). SCR
tools can measure activity in the sympathetic nervous system that changes the sweat levels in
the eccrine glands of the palms. SCR is inexpensive, which makes it widely accessible. In
addition, SCR is relatively easy to use and requires minimal intervention on subjects (Dimoka et
al, 2012). We believe that SCR will be useful in measuring the stress levels associated with
users’ responses to security messages.
An experimental design to test technostress would include a set of treatments wherein
participants would react to computer security messages. The researchers could collect saliva
samples before and after the tasks and compare the levels of cortisol across the treatments.
One would expect the level of cortisol to increase for each participant due to the nature of the
study. In particular, participants who were engaged in the most stress-inducing condition would
be likely to have the highest levels of cortisol in the post-experiment assessment.
4.3

Research Question 3: How does fear influence our neural processing of security
messages?
Fear can have a powerful impact on how individuals respond to security messages. Fear

is an emotional state that occurs in response to the presence of a threat to safety (Witte, 1992;
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Whalen, 1998). It prompts threat-withdrawal (Frijda, 1986) or safety-approaching behaviors
(Blanchard & Blanchard, 1994). In an information security context, both benevolent and
malicious messages commonly attempt to elicit fear to motivate the target into action.
Benevolent security messages such as fear appeals describe a threat to an individual,
and aim to invoke fear as a means of motivating the recipient toward protective security
behaviors (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Johnston et al, 2015). Johnston and Warkentin (2010)
found that fear appeals lead to higher intentions to install anti-spyware than non-fear appeal
messages did. In Vaniea et al (2014) study of user reactions to application update requests,
some participants reported trepidation fueled by past negative experiences about the unknown
consequences of an update on their computer or workflow. Similarly, Good et al (2005)
observed participants’ interactions with end-user license agreements (EULA) as they installed
software on their personal computers, and categorized many users as being “once bitten, twice
shy” or “computer-phobic,” meaning moderately or extremely afraid of adverse consequences
that could result from installing the software. In a study evaluating user interactions with
password strength meters, Ur et al (2012) found that some participants stated that they were
afraid of the consequences of having a weak password. Field studies have found similar results
for fear and security messages. Felt et al (2014) found that SSL warnings with an image of a
criminal were associated with significantly lower click-through rates than were warnings with
images of police officers or red stoplights. The authors reasoned that fear may be the factor
explaining this difference.
Malevolent security messages often describe an artificial threat to evoke fear to goad a
user into action. For example, phishing messages may contain ominous warnings about a threat
to a user’s bank account if the user does not immediately verify their login credentials (Drake et
al, 2004; Kessem, 2012). While users may know about the existence of phishing schemes,
strong emotions such as fear may invoke automatic responses that bypass cognition (Ortiz de
Guinea & Markus, 2009), leading an individual to fall victim to the attack. Such tactics take
advantage of human tendencies to be more risk averse and risk pessimistic while experiencing
fear (Lerner & Keltner, 2001); for example, complying with a phishing email and supplying
account credentials may seem to be the conservative risk option in that it supposedly prevents
the closure of an account and loss of funds.
4.3.1

Fear: Important Gaps in the Literature
Although fear-related models, such as protection motivation theory (PMT), are one of the

most dominant theoretical perspectives in behavioral information security research, the
construct of fear has rarely been directly measured (Boss et al, 2015). Vance et al (2012) used
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a survey to measure PMT-related constructs such as perceived threat vulnerability and threat
severity, but threat and fear are different constructs (Boss et al, 2015). Fear has been shown to
be an important mediator of the threat appraisal process (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Floyd
et al, 2000). The absence of fear measurement in PMT-related studies such as that of Vance et
al (2012) therefore constitutes a missed opportunity that could have altered reported findings.
Several calls have been made for using NeuroIS methods to more effectively measure
fear in an information systems context (e.g., Dimoka et al, 2011; Dimoka et al, 2012; Crossler et
al, 2013; vom Brocke & Liang, 2014). For example, Boss et al (2015) explain:
…the ideal fear measure might be one that is applied at the moment of occurrence. This is
best achieved under tight experimental controls (e.g., fMRI, EKG, or galvanic skin
response). Creating a realistic fear measurement of ISec behaviors under such conditions is
thus highly complex and could be the “holy grail” of this line of research… It might be
necessary to use slightly less invasive techniques, such as eye tracking (e.g., Twyman et al,
2015), examining mouse movements (e.g., Hibbeln et al, 2014), recording keystroke delay
(e.g., Jenkins et al, 2014), or leveraging a wearable galvanic skin response measurement
device (e.g., Moody & Galletta, 2015).
Self-report measures of fear are susceptible to social desirability bias, subjectivity bias, common
method bias, and people’s awareness of their emotion (Dimoka et al, 2011; Lopatovska &
Arapakis, 2011). NeuroIS can help mitigate these challenges by objectively measuring fear as it
occurs.
Another gap in existing studies that Vance et al (2012) illustrated is the underlying
assumption that individuals perceive as personally relevant threats to data and systems.
Johnston et al (2015) explain that “to appeal to the self-interests of their audience, fear appeals
must achieve a sufficient level of personal relevance (or issue involvement) for the individual;
otherwise, they are ignored and rendered ineffective” (p. 114). Although PMT assumes that all
threats are personally relevant, it is not clear whether individuals perceive threats to their
personal data and systems the same way. This discrepancy is even greater for studies such as
Vance et al (2012) that use organizational data because the information and systems under
threat typically do not belong to the individual, but rather to the individual’s employer. Johnston
et al (2015):
The dominant logic behind the application of fear appeals and PMT to information
security phenomena was that threats to data, information, systems, and so on would be
regarded in the same manner as threats to one’s personal safety or health and have
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universal, personal relevance. We challenge this flawed logic. PMT does not account for
the distinction in the nature of the espoused threat and, therefore, has been repeatedly
misspecified in the security literature.
Thus, a gap in the fear-related security literature is whether perceptions of threats to one’s data,
information, and systems differ from perceptions of threats to one’s person, and whether threats
to external information assets are considered personally relevant when they belong to another
entity. These two types of perceived threats may represent entirely different constructs. NeuroIS
has been proven to be useful in disentangling related IS constructs (Dimoka, 2010). As Dimoka
et al (2012) highlights, “the localization of the neural correlates of IS constructs with
neuroimaging data can shed light on their nature, conceptualization, and dimensionality” (p.
692).
Warkentin et al (forthcoming) examine this issue in the context of fear appeals. They
found that reading information security fear appeals did not activate the amygdala. The authors
suggest that this may have been because of low personal relevance of the information threat.
More research is needed to determine whether other types of security messages elicit fear.
Also, future research can investigate whether fear appeals can be designed to foster emotive
fear through highlighting more personally relevant consequences of information threats, such as
increased stress and worry.
A third gap is that studies like Vance et al (2012) only entail a cognitive threat
assessment, whereas visceral emotion is an important characteristic of fear (Dimoka et al,
2011). This gap has been noted by Crossler et al (2013):
Behavioral InfoSec research that captures perceptions of fear does so via a survey
methodology or embedded within a lab experiment. For InfoSec fear appeals to be
effective, however, the appeal must successfully manipulate the neural regions of the
message recipient’s brain responsible for cognitively processing perceptions of threat
and efficacy. … In the studies to date, subjects cognitively assess the instrument items
and their perceptions in cognitive terms, not in the moment of fear occurrence, but rather
as a self-assessment of a perspective determined post-stimulus … Future research
could further utilize fMRI, EEG, or other physiological techniques in a laboratory setting
to better capture the extent to which fear is realized in its affective (emotional) and then
cognitive forms.
Because the experience of emotion is a key aspect of fear, the existing fear-related literature is
incomplete. Further, emotions are difficult to measure using traditional survey methods because
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they often do not rise to the level of awareness (Riedl et al, 2014). This suggests the need for
NeuroIS methods to measure the emotional aspect of fear and how it affects the reception of
security messages.
4.3.2

Fear: How NeuroIS Can Be Used to Address these Gaps
Fear has been captured in neuroscience studies with fMRI (Hsu et al, 2005; Krain et al,

2006) and associated with activity in the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the striatum
(see also Platt & Huettel, 2008; Sarinopoulos et al, 2010). We propose that facial
electromyography (fEMG) is a useful psychophysiological tool to detect fear in subjects
performing a computing task such as interacting with security messages. With fEMG, visually
imperceptible EMG activity in the muscle regions associated with facial expressions (over the
brow—corrugator supercilia, eye—orbicularis oculi, and cheek—zygomatic major) can
differentiate the intensity and valence of an individual’s reactions to visual stimuli. Cacioppo et al
(1988) found that “EMG activity over the muscles of facial expression can provide objective and
continuous probes of affective processes that are too subtle or fleeting to evoke expressions
observable under normal conditions of social interaction” (p. 260). More recently, Minas et al
(2014) used fEMG to examine activity in the corrugator supercilia to determine the emotional
responses in a virtual team setting.
In addition to the brain-imaging tools (see Table 1), one could use mouse-cursor tracking
to study fear. When experiencing fear, people have a lower ability to control their attention on a
single stimulus or destination—that is, people uncontrollably allocate their attention more
broadly to increase awareness of possible threats (Eysenck et al, 2007). Shifts in attention are
measured through the analysis of mouse-cursor movements (e.g., Chen et al, 2001; Guo &
Agichtein, 2010), as hand movements are biased toward stimuli that, even briefly, capture a
person’s attention (Welsh & Elliott, 2004). As people allocate attention more broadly to stimuli
when experiencing fear, the hand deviates away from the intended trajectory (in the directions
of these stimuli), resulting in less precise movements (e.g., Grimes et al, 2013). These
deviations can be measured through analysis of the cursor’s movement trajectory (see Hehman
et al, 2014 for example analyses).
Potential experimental designs using fMRI or fEMG could display the elements of fear
appeals that describe specific threats and then measure whether and how fear is elicited.
Similarly, elements of fear appeals linked to coping responses could be displayed to determine
which neural correlates relate to the coping response process. These neurophysiological
measures could then be compared to self-reported measures of threat and coping appraisals,
and to reported behavioral intention. Mouse cursor tracking could be useful to unobtrusively
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measure responses to fear appeals as they are encountered during naturalistic tasks. This
objective behavioral data could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of different fear appeal
design treatments.
4.4

Research Question 4: How does dual-task interference disrupt cognitive processing
of security messages?
Dual-task interference is a neurological phenomenon that explains why people have

trouble performing two or more relatively simple tasks concurrently (Pashler, 1994). Dual-task
interference can influence how people perceive and cognitively process security messages, and
may be particularly useful for understanding users’ responses, because people respond to
security messages while performing other primary tasks on a computer, such as completing a
work-related task, searching the Internet, or using the computer for entertainment (West, 2008).
As such, when a security message prompts a user’s attention, a person’s working memory and
cognitive functions may be deployed in the primary task. In this scenario, the message must
compete for these cognitive resources, and thus one’s response to the message is subject to
dual-task interference (Pashler, 1994).
Normally, people are not aware of tasks interfering with each other (e.g., responding to a
security message while completing another task on the computer) unless the two tasks are
cognitively difficult, physically incompatible, or evoke negative emotional reactions; thus,
responding to security messages while using the computer for other low cognitively demanding
tasks might seem immune to dual-task interference. However, studies demonstrate that the
opposite is true: tasks can “interfere with each other quite drastically, even though they are
neither intellectually challenging nor physically incompatible” (Pashler, 1994, p. 220). For
example, when people are involved in even simple cognitive tasks, they cannot process
information or perform behaviors related to other tasks as quickly or effectively (e.g., Logan,
1978; Kleiss & Lane, 1986; Duncan & Coltheart, 1987). From a neurological perspective,
research has found that this dual-task interference may result from tasks competing for the
same brain functions (Rémy et al, 2010), and is enhanced when performing two or more tasks
while experiencing stress (Plessow et al, 2012).
Dual-task interference has been suggested as a primary reason for users’ neglect of
security behaviors (Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013). Yee (2004) suggests that “interrupting users
with prompts presents security decisions in a terrible context: it teaches users that security
issues obstruct their main task and trains them to dismiss prompts quickly and carelessly” (p.
49). Users may choose to dismiss warnings quickly and carelessly in this context because it is
cognitively difficult for them to switch between their primary task and optimally address the
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security warning. Bravo-Lillo et al (2011) suggest that interrupting prompts are often ignored or
suboptimally addressed because users have a limited cognitive ability to switch between tasks.
Felt et al (2012) found that the vast majority of people do not pay attention to nor comprehend
permission warnings, and nearly half of laboratory study participants are completely unaware of
permission warnings. These findings suggest that cognitive functions associated with
awareness and comprehension may be limited in the presence of dual-task interference.
Furthermore, when browsing the Internet, people pervasively ignore and quickly dismiss
security warnings that pop up in the middle of another task (e.g., Akhawe & Felt, 2013).
Although many factors contribute to the automatic dismissal of security warnings, one potential
explanation is that people have difficulty devoting the necessary cognitive resources to process
the warning while performing other tasks.
4.4.1

Dual-task Interference: Important Gaps in the Literature

The literature has reported the behavioral effects of dual-task interference, but has not yet
explored its neurological underpinnings. Research suggests three competing models that may
explain how dual-task interference influences users’ responses to security messages: (1) the
capacity-sharing model, (2) the bottleneck (task-switching) model, and (3) the cross-talk model
(Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013). The capacity-sharing model explains that when people perform
multiple tasks together, less cognition is available for each task, as the tasks share limited
cognitive capacity (Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). The bottleneck model suggests that if one task is
using a cognitive resource, it is not available for other tasks (Pashler, 1994; Dux et al, 2006;
Sigman & Dehaene, 2006). The cross-talk model suggests that concurrent tasks cause the mind
to confuse the various sources of information, resulting in biases and reduced performance
(Koch, 2009). These neurological effects of dual-task interference on security message
disregard can only be directly observed using NeuroIS methodologies.
Understanding the neurological underpinnings of dual-task interference is an important gap
to address because it validates dual-task interference as an appropriate theoretical approach.
Although behavioral studies have used dual-task interference as a theoretical lens to explain
security message disregard (e.g., Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013), they have not established that
dual-task interference exists when people respond to security messages. It is therefore unclear
whether dual-task interference is the primary cause of the observed effects, or if other factors
are at work. A neurological understanding of dual-task interference could also guide the design
and development of more effective security warnings. A security message should be designed
differently depending on whether the capacity-sharing model, the bottleneck model, or the
cross-talk model best accounts for security message disregard. For example, if NeuroIS tools
29

indicate that the brain shares cognitive resources among concurrent tasks while responding to
security messages (the capacity-sharing model), an effective security message design could
guide the user through the decision-making process to rely less on shared resources. If the
primary task inhibits people from activating brain functions needed to properly respond to
security messages (the bottleneck model), security messages could be designed to temporarily
stop the primary task so that these resources will be available (i.e., allowing the user to
cognitively offload the primary task). If NeuroIS tools indicate that information from other tasks is
biasing one’s response to the security message (the cross-talk model), security messages could
be accompanied by other cues (colors, sound, and images) to prime thoughts that promote
positive cross-talk (e.g., enhancing perceived threat).
Another gap that NeuroIS can help address is to identify which regions of the brain are
influenced by dual-task interference while people are responding to security messages. This
gap has not yet been addressed in the behavioral approach of past studies (e.g., Jenkins &
Durcikova, 2013), but it is important to address for more effective security message design. For
example, if NeuroIS tools indicate that dual-task interference occurs in the medial temporal lobe
of the brain (the area responsible for declarative or long-term memory), warnings could be
designed to be less reliant on memory by providing just-in-time reminders and other relevant
information that would otherwise be stored in long-term memory.
4.4.2

Dual-task Interference: How NeuroIS Can Be Used to Address these Gaps
Brain imaging methodologies (see Table 1) are effective in measuring dual-task

interference, and several studies have used fMRI (e.g., Herath et al, 2001; Szameitat et al,
2002; Jiang, 2004). Electroencephalography (EEG) can be an effective technique for examining
the cognitive consequences of dual-task interference. Using EEG, the P300 brainwave
component of the event-related potential (ERP) can be examined, which is associated with
attention and memory operations (Polich, 2007). The P300 reflects brain activity approximately
300–600 milliseconds after exposure to a stimulus. The speed of this measure reveals reaction
differences in subjects before they have time to consciously contemplate a response. Monitoring
a person’s EEG measures as they perform a computing task that a security message interrupts
can allow researchers to see the degree to which the message disrupted the task and the level
of cognitive resources devoted to the message. Vance et al (2014) used EEG to predict user
behavior in response to security warnings.
Another brain-imaging tool that could be useful for studying dual-task interference is
functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIR). fNIR uses certain wavelengths of light to measure
changes in oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin (BOLD response) and it is especially
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effective in brain regions close to the scalp, such as the frontal cortex (Cui et al, 2011).
McKendrick et al (2014) used fNIR to monitor subjects performing a dual verbal-spatial working
memory task and observed changes in activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
during the experiment. Gefen et al (2014) demonstrated the applicability of fNIR to enhance
research in information systems, specifically in research related to multitasking. The ease of use
and low costs associated with fNIR make it a prime candidate for NeuroIS research on security
messages.
Potential experimental designs could use fMRI, EEG, and fNIR to measure the influence
of dual-task interference on security messages in a within-subject design in which each
participant would respond to security messages in three scenarios: (a) during a high dual-task
inference time, (b) during a low dual-task interference time, and (c) during a no dual-task
interference time. A simple way to induce high dual-task interference is to have participants
memorize a seven-digit alphanumeric code, respond to a security message, and then recall the
code. Requiring users to maintain the code in working memory while responding to the security
message induces high dual-task interference. A low dual-task interference time can be between
completed tasks: having a person memorize a code, recall the code, and then respond to a
security message. A no dual-task interference time can be a scenario in which participants’ only
task is to respond to security messages. By comparing brain activation for the high dual-task
interference, low dual-task interference, and no dual-task interference times, researchers can
assess the impact of dual-task interference on the neural processing of security messages, and
test whether some security messages are more robust to dual-task interference than other
messages.
5

EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
This section describes an experiment as an example of how to use NeuroIS to pursue

one of the research questions, habituation to security messages. It is an illustrative example
rather than a substantial knowledge contribution in its own right, but the experiment shows the
value of using NeuroIS to investigate the research questions.
As noted in section 4.1.1, a gap in our understanding exists for how habituation to
security messages occurs in the brain because habituation is difficult to measure directly with
conventional methods. Anderson et al (2015b) took an initial step to address this gap by using
fMRI to show how habituation develops in the brain. Using the BOLD effect, the researchers
were able to measure changes in blood flow to different brain regions, which in turn is indicative
of localized brain activity (Anderson et al, 2015b). Their results showed a dramatic drop in the
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visual processing centers of the brain after the second exposure to a warning, with further
decreases upon subsequent exposures. The researchers designed warnings whose
appearance is updated with each exposure (i.e., polymorphic warnings) to manipulate
habituation. Their fMRI results demonstrated that the polymorphic warnings were significantly
more resistant to the development of habituation in the brain than conventional warnings were.
Although the results of Anderson et al (2015b) represent a promising first step to
examine the problem of habituation using NeuroIS methods, Dimoka et al (2012) emphasize
that “no single neurophysiological measure is usually sufficient on its own, and it is advisable to
use many data sources to triangulate across measures” (p. 694). Accordingly, in the following
example, we use (1) a different NeuroIS method, eye tracking; and (2) a different neurological
phenomenon, the EMM effect, to triangulate the fMRI results of Anderson et al (2015b).
Whereas fMRI has superior spatial resolution for identifying which parts of the brain are
influenced by habituation, eye tracking has superior temporal resolution for understanding the
progressive occurrence of habituation. Utilizing the strengths of both methods, we can validate
these methods’ ability to measure the phenomenon of interest (Dimoka et al, 2012), in this case
habituation.
5.1

Eye Tracking and Hypotheses
Eye tracking is a NeuroIS method (Dimoka et al, 2012) that is well suited for measuring

habituation in our study for three reasons. First, eye tracking, like many other NeuroIS methods,
excels at capturing “hidden (automatic or unconscious) mental processes (e.g., ethics, deep
emotions) that are difficult or even impossible to measure with existing measurement methods
and tools” (Dimoka et al, 2011, p. 688). Habituation is one such process because it is automatic
and fundamentally occurs at the neurological level (Grill-Spector et al, 2006); people are likely
not fully aware of the extent of their habituation to warnings. In the study’s context, eye tracking
can capture the neurological EMM effect, and therefore directly measure habituation to security
messages. Second, security warnings are visual stimuli that require attention to the details of
their appearance and message. Eye tracking can fully capture users’ visual inspection of
warnings. Third, habituation and decisions to respond to warnings occur very quickly (BravoLillo et al, 2013). With temporal precision in the tens of milliseconds, eye tracking is well suited
to examine habituation to visual stimuli.
Per the EMM effect (see Section 4.1.1), we hypothesize that over repeated views of
security warnings, people will exhibit fewer eye-gaze fixations and less visual sampling of the
warning (Smith et al, 2006). Many warning styles follow similar design principles; for instance,
indicators of alarm include bright red colors, exclamation marks, bold text, and two buttons for
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choosing whether to heed or ignore the warning. As users are exposed to repeated warnings,
they will become more familiar with their common design, even if they originate from different
applications. This increased familiarity should lead to increased reliance on memory, which
should in turn be associated with decreased visual processing, according to the EMM effect.
Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H1: Warning gaze duration will decrease over successive viewings per subject.
However, constantly changing the visual appearance of a warning type (i.e., a
polymorphic warning) should prevent users from becoming habituated to the warning as quickly.
Memory will be relied on less because the warning’s appearance will be different from the last
time it was viewed, so there will not be a perfect match between the modified polymorphic
warning and an existing memory. Consequently, users will be more likely to give higher visual
attention to a polymorphic warning over repeated viewings as opposed to a statically presented
one. In summary, we hypothesize:
H2: Warning gaze duration will decrease more rapidly when viewing static warnings
compared to polymorphic warnings.
5.2

Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we implemented a within-subject design in which people

randomly viewed variations of polymorphic or static warnings. We then explored the number of
fixations people made on the entire warning and the warning text over subsequent viewings to
gauge the EEM effect.
We first developed a polymorphic warning UI-design artifact. To do so, we used the
warning science literature to develop nine graphical variations of a warning dialog expected to
capture attention. Our polymorphic warning artifact rotated through the graphical variations on
each subsequent exposure. Each graphic variation was chosen based on variation suggestions
in the literature. Table 4 lists each variation with its supporting sources, and Figure 4 depicts
each variation for one example warning.
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(a) Original Warning
Screenshot

(b) Color of Text Variation

I Highlight of Text Variation

(d) Signal Word Variation

(e) Pictorial Signals Variation

(f) Ordering of Options Variation

(g) Color Variation

(h) Size Variation (3x Larger)

(i) Contrast Variation

(j) Border Variation
Figure 4. Polymorphic warning design variants
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Table 4. Polymorphic variations and their support from the literature
Text Appearance

Support

Color of text (red text)

Laughery et al (1993); Braun et al (1994)

Highlighting of text (yellow highlighting)

Strawbridge (1986); Young and Wogalter (1990)

Message Content

Support

Pictorial symbols (an exclamation point)

Kalsher et al (1996); Sojourner and Wogalter (1997)

Signal word (“Attention”)

Silver and Wogalter (1989); Kalsher et al (1995)

Warning Appearance

Support

Color (red background)

Braun and Silver (1995); Rudin-Brown et al (2004)

Contrast (white on black)

Sanders and McCormick (1987); Young (1991)

Ordering of options (reordered)

Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón (2007b); De
Keukelaere et al (2009)

Size (large)

(Vigilante Jr & Wogalter, 2003); Wogalter and Vigilante
(2006)

5.3

Experimental Design
We used a Tobii T120 (see Figure 5) to measure the EEM effect. The eye tracker can

track participants’ eye movement with or without corrected vision (contact lenses and glasses),
so we did not need to exclude any participants based on eyesight.

Figure 5. Tobii T120 Eye Tracker with Integrated Monitor

Participants were instructed to sit in a chair in front of the desk where the Tobii monitor
was stationed. Using the Tobii software, participants’ seating was adjusted until their gaze was
in the optimal range. Participants also had their eye tracking calibrated with a task that had a
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moving red dot (slightly increasing and decreasing in size throughout the calibration) that would
move around the screen. In this way, we could determine, based on output from the system,
whether all the regions of the screen were sufficiently tracked. If there was an error, the
participant was resituated and recalibrated. The calibration process took approximately five
minutes.
Participants were then presented with a series of warnings. Each participant saw ten
warnings: five randomly assigned to the polymorphic treatment and five to the static treatment.
Each warning was repeated 10 times. For the polymorphic warning, participants saw the 9
variations plus the original image. For the static treatment, participants saw the same warning
repeated 10 times. The images were randomly selected and displayed using the sequencing
feature of the software. The experiment lasted from 10 to 20 minutes.
Participants were instructed to examine each warning carefully (see Figure 4) and
assess whether the warning was: (1) novel within the study context, (2) similar to or a modified
version of a previous image, and (3) identical to other images within the study. The warnings
were self-paced, meaning participants could control how long they viewed each image before
proceeding. This was done to mimic real life in which people choose how long to view a warning
before dismissing it.
After viewing all of the warnings, we administered a post-experiment survey with
demographic information, security attitude, and behavior intentions. To ensure manipulation
validity (Straub et al, 2004), the post-test survey included a manipulation-check question that
displayed a polymorphic warning as it rotated through its variations. Participants were asked if
they noticed the treatment during the task. All but five of the participants reported that they had
noticed the experimental treatment, which indicated successful overall manipulation. Following
Straub et al., we elected to retain participants who reported that they were not manipulated to
provide “a more robust testing of the hypotheses” (Straub et al, 2004, p. 408).
5.4

Participants
We pilot tested our experimental design with 20 participants. After making adjustments,

we ran the final version of the experiment and collected usable data from 62 participants.
Students were recruited from a large private university in the United States and given extra
credit for participating. Participant age ranged from 18 to 30 with a mean of 21.66 years. Of the
62 participants, 23 (37%) were female. Each participant saw approximately 110 warnings,
resulting in 6,200 observations.
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5.5

Analysis
The hypotheses were analyzed using latent growth curve modeling, a longitudinal

statistical technique used to estimate growth trajectories over time (McArdle & Nesselroade,
2003). The analysis estimates an intercept and slope for observed values over time. In the study
context, the observed values refer to the number of fixations on the warning and the text across
each successive viewing of a warning.
Our eye tracker recorded fixations at a rate of 60 hertz, capturing millions of eye
movement records from participants as they viewed the warnings. The number of fixations is
roughly equivalent to the number of 16.66 ms time periods that the person was gazing at the
area of interest. Figure 6 plots the Lowess curve (a plotting method for fitting a smooth curve
between two variables) for the number of fixations over time on the warning. Prior to the
analysis, a square-root transformation was performed on the number of fixations (a typical
transformation for counts) to increase linearity of the trend lines.

Figure 6. Growth Trend of Fixations on Warning

The latent growth curve model was specified for the number of fixations on the warning
over time. In the model, the square root of the number of fixations on the warning was included
as the observed values at each time step (D1 to D10 successively in Figure 7). Relationships
from the intercept (I) and slope (S) latent variables were specified to each time step. A dummy
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variable was included to indicate whether the warning was polymorphic or static (polymorphic =
1, static = 0), and to allow us to explore whether the intercept or slope was statistically different
between the treatment groups.

Figure 7. Latent growth curve model for both analyses
(Fixations on Warning and Fixations on Warning Text).
“I” is the model intercept, and “S” is the slope. “Di” is
the display count of the warning. The numbers on the
path indicate the weight of the intercept and slope at a
given time period. For example, the estimate of warning
fixations at D2 would be y = S(1) + I(1) and at D3 would
be y = S(2) + I(1).

The analysis is shown in Table 5. The slope of warning fixation over time was
significantly negative, indicating that people gazed less at warnings over successive viewings
(−0.496, p < .001, H1 supported). However, the effect of polymorphic warnings on the slope was
significantly positive, indicating that the slope for polymorphic warnings was less negative and
decreased more gradually (0.092, p < .01, H2 supported).
Table 5. Latent Growth Curve Parameter Results

Intercept (I) Slope (S) I ~ polymorphic S ~ polymorphic
Estimate 11.073

-0.523

0.142

0.139

Std. Err.

0.531

0.061

0.339

0.039

z-Value

20.865

-8.592

0.419

3.526

p-value

p < .001

p < .001

p > .05

p < .01
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6

DISCUSSION
This study makes several important contributions—conceptual, empirical, and practical

—to the study of security messages and to behavioral information security generally, as
elaborated below.
6.1

Conceptual Contributions
First, we have presented a research agenda comprising four questions for researching

users’ reception of security messages using NeuroIS methods. Each question was drawn from
an extensive review of the IS, HCI, and NeuroIS literatures. This agenda is a valuable resource
to the behavioral information security community because it (1) identifies several potentially
fruitful streams of research, and (2) identifies a variety of NeuroIS methods that are well suited
to investigating each question. Thus, this research agenda can assist scholars in initiating
research on behavioral processing of security messages.
Second, this paper advocates a multidisciplinary approach to the study of security
messages, integrating behavioral information security and cognitive neuroscience to increase
our understanding beyond that of traditional experimental observation and self-reporting. Our
research questions are amenable to a NeuroIS lens because habituation, stress, fear, and dualtask interference are deeply rooted in our psyches and affect our behavior unconsciously, and
these factors are difficult to capture without neurophysiological measures (Riedl et al, 2014).
Using NeuroIS methods to directly observe the brain can afford insights about IS phenomena
that could not be gained otherwise (Dimoka et al, 2011).
6.2

Empirical Contributions
Although the purpose of our illustrative experiment was primarily to demonstrate how

NeuroIS methods can be applied to investigate the research questions, the results also make
empirical contributions. Although the literature has frequently cited habituation to warnings as a
problem, few studies have empirically examined habituation. The studies that did used indirect
measures, such as warning click-through rates (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2013). An exception is
Anderson et al (2015b), who used fMRI to show how habituation occurs in the brain, and
demonstrated that their polymorphic design is effective in reducing habituation. This study
provides additional empirical support for those findings.
Our illustrative experiment demonstrates how multiple NeuroIS tools can complement
each other and compensate for weaknesses inherent in individual methods. In the case of
Anderson et al (2015b), fMRI excels in its ability to spatially locate neural activity in the brain.
However, this method required concessions in ecological validity, as participants were required
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to view the warnings while lying down in an MRI scanner. In contrast, eye tracking was used to
noninvasively obtain precise eye movements as a behavioral measure for habituation while
participants viewed security warnings in a typical desktop computing configuration. Thus, eye
tracking was used to triangulate the results of the fMRI experiment, and enhance the ecological
results of Anderson et al (2015b).
The experiment’s results prove the value of our NeuroIS research agenda for security
messages (Nunamaker & Briggs, 2012), demonstrating the kind and quality of insights that can
be gained by pursuing our proposed research questions. Our initial foray into the question of
how habituation to security messages can be reduced suggests related questions. For example,
it is unknown how habituation to security messages changes over time, as existing studies have
only examined the onset of habituation within a period of a few minutes (Brustoloni & VillamarínSalomón, 2007b; Bravo-Lillo et al, 2013). Our results illustrate the promise of NeuroIS to
increase our understanding of users’ reception to security messages, leading to the
development of more complete behavioral theories and guiding the design of more effective
security messages (Dimoka et al, 2012).
6.3

Implications for Practice
Our findings have important implications for practice in the development of interventions

to reduce habituation to security warnings. Rather than relying only on interventions such as
SETA programs, which encourage greater vigilance (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011), our results
suggest that an effective complementary measure is to develop UI design artifacts that reduce
habituation in the brain, such as the polymorphic warning developed in this study. Rather than
requiring explanations and training that can require hours or days, our polymorphic artifact
elicits positive effects in milliseconds. In providing this benefit, the polymorphic warning artifact
in this study is unobtrusive and imposes no additional cost to the user. In contrast, other
techniques for curbing habituation, such as imposing a time delay on security warnings before
they can be dismissed (Brustoloni & Villamarín-Salomón, 2007b; Bravo-Lillo et al, 2013),
impose a cost that can be considerable over time and when aggregated over a large workforce
or population (Herley, 2009). Our polymorphic warning artifact is simple and cost-effective to
implement in virtually any kind of system. With minimal additional graphical design and
programming necessary to create a few variations, polymorphic warnings can help prevent
habituation to warnings.
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7

CONCLUSION
NeuroIS has the potential to provide new understanding of how users respond to

security messages, a problem that has long vexed security researchers (Adams & Sasse, 1999;
Bravo-Lillo et al, 2013). In this paper, we presented a NeuroIS research agenda to examine four
key neurological factors relating to how users receive and process security messages. Further,
we presented the results of an experiment that illustrate the value and kinds of insights that can
be derived using a NeuroIS approach. By pursuing these research questions, IS security
scholars can significantly advance our understanding of security messages and how to design
them to be more effective.
8
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APPENDIX A: SECURITY MESSAGES TAXONOMY
Figure A1 depicts a taxonomy of security messages along with specific examples, which
consistent with our definition, may be offensive or defensive in nature. Our scheme classifies
security messages according to three primary dimensions: (1) immediacy, (2) relevancy, and (3)
complexity. Immediacy refers to the extent to which a message can be deferred. At one
extreme, modal software dialogs by design interrupt the user’s workflow until the message has
been processed (Egelman et al, 2008). On the other end of the spectrum, security advisories
are often in email form, which can be easily set aside for later processing (Weber, 2004).
Immediacy has important implications for how security messages are processed because users
are less likely to act on messages that can be deferred (Egelman et al, 2008). This is why web
browsers have recently emphasized modal warnings that interrupt the user rather than passive
indicators that reside in the chrome of the browser and are easily overlooked (Akhawe & Felt,
2013).
Relevancy concerns the applicability of a security message to the workflow or task that
the user is engaged in. Users are more likely to process security messages that are anticipated
or clearly applicable to the present task (Vredenburgh & Zackowitz, 2006). In contrast, security
messages that have little connection to a user’s current activity are less easily processed
because they require users to switch attention from the task at hand (Meyer, 2006). This is one
reason why information security policies (ISPs) are less likely to be followed if they are separate
from a user’s routine work activities (Vance et al, 2012). This is also why spear-phishing attacks
that are targeted to a user’s work are much more effective (Luo et al, 2013).
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Complexity describes the informational density of a security message, the mental effort
required to process the message, or both. Security messages can be very sparse, such as
software dialogs that contain only a few words. Conversely, other security messages contain
multiple sub-arguments, such as fear appeals, which convey (1) the severity of a threat, (2) the
user’s susceptibility to a threat, (3) the efficacy of a suggested response, and (4) the user’s selfefficacy to enact the protective action (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Johnston et al, 2015). More
complex still are legalistic, acceptable-use policies that users find intractable (Foltz et al, 2008).
For simplicity of presentation, the taxonomy depicts a binary, high/low classification for
each dimension, but each message falls along a gradient for each dimension. Some types of
security messages (e.g., phishing emails) are flexible enough to fall into several categories. For
example, phishing emails may offer a single link as bait or be long and abstruse like a Nigerian
419 scam (Herley, 2012). The hierarchical ordering of the taxonomy suggests a precedence
among the dimensions, with immediacy being the most important factor in whether a user
processes a message because messages high in immediacy can interrupt the user and demand
attention (Lesch, 2006; Egelman et al, 2008). We consider relevancy to be the next most
important factor, given that if a message is determined to be highly relevant, a user will invest
time and effort to process the message, regardless of complexity (Vredenburgh & Zackowitz,
2006).
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Figure A1. Taxonomy of security messages
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APPENDIX B. LISTING OF ARTICLES IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Table B1. Selection of research areas relating to security messages from AIS-6, HCI sources
Citation

Outlet

Type of security message

Supported RQs

(Anderson &
Agarwal, 2010)

MIS
Quarterly

Effect of persuasive general
public security notices on
security intentions and
attitudes

Attitudes and beliefs (concern
about security threats, responseefficacy, self-efficacy),
norms

(Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010)

MIS
Quarterly

Fear appeals encouraging
antispyware installation

Intention-behavior,
fear

(Felt et al, 2014)

CHI

SSL warnings

Fear,
attention

(Vaniea et al, 2014)

CHI

Program update (patch)
prompts

Fear,
uncertainty,
comprehension

(Egelman et al,
2013)

CHI

Password strength meter

Motivation (encouragement),
comprehension

(Lin et al, 2011)

CHI

Phishing security, antiphishing user interfaces

Deception detection

(Villamarín-Salomón
& Brustoloni, 2010)

CHI

Handling of phishing email
messages

Habituation,
motivation (rewards)

(Sankarpandian et
al, 2008)

CHI

Application patch process
manager

(Egelman et al,
2008)

CHI

Phishing warnings

(Kumaraguru et al,
2007)

CHI

Phishing education system

(Dhamija et al, 2006)

CHI

(Crossler et al, 2013)

Computers &
Security

(Bravo-Lillo et al,
2013)

SOUPS

Browser-based cues and
security indicators in a
phishing context
Fear appeals, interactive
security prompts, malware
warnings
Browser plugin installation
warning

Comprehension,
attention,
motivation (persistent security
notifications)
Habituation,
comprehension,
attitudes and beliefs (trust in the
warning, perceived threat
likelihood, threat severity, riskavoidance)
Deception detection
Attention,
comprehension
Fear,
intention-behavior
Habituation
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Table B1. Selection of research areas relating to security messages from AIS-6, HCI sources
Citation

Outlet

Type of security message

Supported RQs

(Felt et al, 2012)

SOUPS

Android app installation
(malware)

Attention,
comprehension,
technostress,
information processing
(unawareness)

(Raja et al, 2011)

SOUPS

Firewall warnings

Comprehension

(Maurer et al, 2011)

SOUPS

Tool-tip alert dialogs

Habituation

(Sotirakopoulos et al,
2011)

SOUPS

SSL warnings

Intention-behavior,
habituation

(Motiee et al, 2010)

SOUPS

Windows UAC, malware

Attention,
comprehension

(Kumaraguru et al,
2009)

SOUPS

anti-phishing training

Deception detection,
demographics (gender, age)

(Sheng et al, 2007)

SOUPS

Anti-phishing training

Deception detection

(Brustoloni &
Villamarín-Salomón,
2007b)

SOUPS

Open email attachment
dialogs

Habituation,
motivation (accountability)

(Wu et al, 2006)

SOUPS

Anti-phishing toolbar

Attention,
deception detection

(Downs et al, 2006)

SOUPS

Phishing

Deception detection

(Good et al, 2005)

SOUPS

Installing software with
spyware, installation
warnings, EULA

(Dhamija & Tygar,
2005)

SOUPS

Phishing browser warnings

(Conti et al, 2005)

SOUPS

Attack vectors against
visual intrusion detection
systems

(Akhawe & Felt,
2013)

USENIX

Browser malware, phishing,
and SSL warnings

Comprehension,
fear,
attention
Deception detection,
technostress,
information processing (cognitive
demands)
Deception detection,
technostress,
attitudes and beliefs (trust),
information processing (cognitive
demands)
Habituation,
attitudes and beliefs (annoyance),
technostress,
information processing (security
messages as interruptions)
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Table B1. Selection of research areas relating to security messages from AIS-6, HCI sources
Citation

Outlet

Type of security message

Supported RQs

(Ur et al, 2012)

USENIX

Password strength meters

Attention,
fear,
motivation (encouragement),
attitudes and beliefs (annoyance,
laziness),
technostress,
information processing (cognitive
demands)

(Sunshine et al,
2009)

USENIX

SSL warnings

Habituation,
comprehension
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Table B2. Expanded and reduced lists of extracted research questions from AIS-6 and HCI
computer science literature
Expanded

Reduced

Research Question

n

Research Question

n

Comprehension

10

Comprehension

18

Attention

7

Deception detection

8

Attention/habituation

22

Habituation

8

Fear

6

Fear

6

Stress/technostress

5

Stress

5

Intention-behavior

3

Intention-behavior

3

Information processing (cognitive demands)

3

Information processing (security messages
as interruptions)

2

Dual-task interference

6

Information processing (unawareness)

1

Attitudes and beliefs (annoyance)

2

Attitudes and beliefs (laziness)

1

Attitudes and beliefs, motivations

10

Attitudes and beliefs (concern about
security threats, response-efficacy, selfefficacy)
Attitudes and beliefs (perceived threat
likelihood, threat severity, risk avoidance)

1
1

Attitudes and beliefs (trust)

2

Motivation (encouragement)

2

Motivation (accountability)

1

Motivation (persistent security notifications)

1

Motivation (rewards)

1

Gender differences

1

Gender differences

1

Norms

1

Norms

1

Uncertainty

1

Uncertainty

1
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Table B3. IS security issues and opinions, call for papers, and research agendas
Type of
Supported RQs of
Citation
Outlet
Notes
paper
Interest
Fear, intention(Crossler et Computers &
Research
behavior gap,
al, 2013)
agenda
security policy
Security
compliance
Highlights the importance of
improving practical relevance for IS
European
(Siponen &
security field surveys, suggesting
Issues and
Intention-behavior
Journal of
Smith,
that such improvements can lessen
Opinions
gap, insider threat
Information
2014)
data measurement issues
Systems
associated with the intentionbehavior gap.
European
(Warkentin
Issues and
Intention-behavior
Journal of
& Willison,
Focus on the insider threat.
Opinions
gap, insider threat
Information
2009)
Systems
European
(Warkentin
Focus on the insider threat
Special
Intention-behavior
Journal of
& Willison,
(volitional and accidental security
Issue CFP
gap, insider threat
Information
2008)
policy violations).
Systems
Hawaii
Intention-behavior
International
(Warkentin
Conference gap, insider threat,
Conference on
et al, 2014)
CFP
security-policy
System
compliance
Sciences
Emphasizes the practical
(Siponen &
importance of research. Behavioral
Conference Insider threat,
Smith,
ICIS 2014
security topics include insider
CFP
policy compliance
2014)
threats (malicious and careless
external attacks.
Information
(Tarafdar et
Special
Technostress,
Systems
al, 2013)
Issue CFP
insider threat
Journal
Calls for research on the “darker
side” of IT for organizations,
Deceptive IT;
societies, and individuals. Two
irresponsible
relevant topics of interest include
Information
(Fichman et
Special
exposure of
“dissemination of information with
Systems
al, 2014)
Issue CFP
personal
dangerous applications [...] related
Research
information through
to risky personal behavior” and
use of dangerous IT
“information technology used for
fraud and deception.”
Heavy focus on calling for more
(Mahmood
Issues and
Behavioral security,
research about information security
MIS Quarterly
et al, 2010)
Opinions
outsider threat
attackers.
Security from a management
(Mahmood
Special
perspective as opposed to
Behavioral security
MIS Quarterly
et al, 2008)
Issue CFP
technical solutions (behavioral
security).
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Table B4. NeuroIS issues and opinions and research agendas
Literature stream-specific
Citation
Outlet
RQ
(Riedl,
ACM SIGMIS
Technostress
2012)
Database
Triangulate objective data with
self-report, advance TAM
Business &
(technostress, dis/engagement,
(Loos et
Information
cognitive absorption, etc.),
al, 2010)
Systems
gender differences, evaluate
Engineering
and inform design science
(develop human-computer
interfacing technology).
Discussed in the context of
studying TAM: cognition
(absorption, workload, etc.),
Communications of affective (enjoyment, anxiety),
(Riedl et
the Association for
automatic processing.
al, 2010)
Information
Systems
Discussed as general RQs:
especially uncertainty, risk, and
ambiguity. Trust and distrust.
Gender.
(Dimoka
et al,
2011)

Information
Systems Research

(vom
Brocke &
Liang,
2014)

Journal of
Management
Information
Systems

(Dimoka
et al,
2012)

MIS Quarterly

Intention-behavior (overcome
self-report biases), deep
emotions
Reduce self-reporting bias
(intention-behavior gap), plus
all security-relevant topics in
special issue: technology
acceptance, emotions, trust,
stress
Collect objective data
(intention-behavior gap), deep
or hidden emotions such as
fear, IS adoption and use
(including cognitive overload,
anxiety, technostress), habitual
systems interaction patterns.
Decision making (uncertainty),
online trust

Triangulated RQ

Notes

Technostress
Intention-behavior
gap,
technostress,
habituation,
gender
differences

Habituation RQ
supported
through focus
on user
engagement
with systems.

Technostress,
fear, habituation,
uncertainty, risk,
trust, gender
differences

Fear through
affect emphasis;
habituation
through
automatic
processing
emphasis.

Intention-behavior
gap, fear,
attention,
uncertainty
Intention-behavior
gap, fear,
technostress

Intention-behavior
gap, fear,
technostress,
attention
(engagement)
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Table B5. Support for RQs from NeuroIS issues and opinions and research agendas
RQ

NeuroIS
Supported?

Supporting papers (&
notes)

Supporting arguments
(summary)

DLPFC, under the
“assessing Information
and Cognitive
Overload” section
(Dimoka et al, 2012, p.
685).
Attention in Section 1
“Localizing neural
correlates of usability”
(Dimoka et al, 2011).
Attention/habituation

Yes
User engagement:
(Loos et al, 2010).
Heart rate (frequently
EKG) to measure
cognitive attention,
(Riedl et al, 2010, p.
246).

Attention and habituation
can be an unconscious
event. Measuring
attention via self-report
can interfere with the very
thing that is being
measured—it can break
user engagement with the
task at hand.

Attention (vom Brocke
& Liang, 2014, p. 222).

Comprehension

Indirectly
supported, via
learning to
comprehend.

Use fMRI to study
neural correlates of
deception and eye
tracking to study
deception detection,
and study “how
learning [about
deception detection]
can be achieved in
fearful situations, such
as phishing websites”
(Dimoka et al, 2012, p.
687 (emphasis
added)).

Comprehension may not
be better measured using
non-NeuroIS methods.

Localize different types
of learning (Dimoka et
al, 2011, p. 9)
Fear

Yes

(Riedl et al, 2010;
Dimoka et al, 2012;
vom Brocke & Liang,
2014)

Fear has deep, hidden
emotional components
that can be uncovered
with NeuroIS.
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Table B5. Support for RQs from NeuroIS issues and opinions and research agendas
RQ

Stress

Dual-task interference

NeuroIS
Supported?

Supporting papers (&
notes)

Supporting arguments
(summary)

Yes, via
technostress

(Loos et al, 2010; Riedl
et al, 2010; Dimoka et
al, 2012; Riedl, 2012;
vom Brocke & Liang,
2014)

Stress (and by inclusion
technostress) can be
difficult to measure via
self-report, due to deep
components or
participants’ inability to
answer.

Yes

“Complex cognitive
processes (e.g.,
cognitive overload)”
(Dimoka et al, 2012, p.
680; vom Brocke &
Liang, 2014, p. 221)
Difficult-to-measure
latent variables
(Dimoka et al, 2011, p.
15)

Dual-task interference can
be considered as a latent
variable from a complex
cognitive process.

Yes

“Antecedents of human
behavior” (Dimoka et
al, 2011; Dimoka et al,
2012; vom Brocke &
Liang, 2014)

NeuroIS is appropriate if
measurement of the
attitude, belief, or
motivation is otherwise
subject to bias or occurs
at an unconscious level.

Intention-behavior

Yes

Yes, via the idea of
collecting objective,
unbiased data (Loos et
al, 2010; Dimoka et al,
2011; Dimoka et al,
2012; vom Brocke &
Liang, 2014)

NeuroIS is good for
investigating this gap as it
captures unbiased data.

Gender differences

Yes

(Loos et al, 2010; Riedl
et al, 2010)

NeuroIS can uncover
differences in brain
activity between genders.

Yes

Uncertainty and
ambiguity (Dimoka et
al, 2011)

Uncertainty and ambiguity
may have hidden
neurophysiological
correlates.

Yes

“Antecedents of human
behavior” (Dimoka et
al, 2011; Dimoka et al,
2012; vom Brocke &
Liang, 2014)

NeuroIS is appropriate as
norms may influence an
individual’s choice
unconsciously, or to the
degree that self-reports
would be biased.

Attitudes and beliefs, motivations

Uncertainty

Norms
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